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The First Amendment is the immune system of
the body politic. Just as the AIDS crisis has taught
the tragic and sobering lesson that damage to the
body's natural defenses leaves it susceptible to
contagion from a wide variety of sources, the cul-
ture of regulation associated with electronic me-
dia makes the concept of free speech vulnerable
to bureaucratic manipulation. Censorship is con-
tagious, and experience with this culture of regu-
lation teaches that regulatory enthusiasts herald
each new medium of communications as another
opportunity to spread the disease.
The First Amendment commands that Con-
gress shall make no law abridging freedom of
speech or of the press, but the courts historically
have allowed a greater degree of governmental in-
tervention with respect to broadcast content than
with traditional print media on the theory that
"differences in the characteristics of new media
justify differences in the First Amendment stan-
dard applied to them."' As the Supreme Court
stated in Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC,
" [b] ecause of the scarcity of radio frequencies,
the Government is permitted to put restraints on
licensees in favor of . . . [the public's] collective
right to have the medium function consistently
with the ends and purposes of the First Amend-
ment. "2
This difference in treatment carries significant
constitutional ramifications. As Dean Lee Bollin-
ger has noted, the Supreme Court decisions re-
garding broadcasting and the First Amendment
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I Red Lion Broad. Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 386 (1969)
(citing Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495, 503
(1952)).
2 Id. at 390.
3 LEE C. BOLLINGER, IMAGES OF A FREE PREss 71 (Univ. of
Chicago Press) (1991).
4 Id. at 66.
5 Id. at 72.
amount to a "virtual celebration of public regula-
tion"3 representing "[n]othing less . . . than a
complete conceptual reordering of the relation-
ships between the government, the press and the
public that was established with New York Times v.
Sullivan."4 To read cases like Red Lion is to "step
into another world," where the press itself repre-
sents the greatest threat to First Amendment val-
ues, and government intervention in editorial
choices is the preferred method of salvation.5 It is
a vision of the First Amendment, in the words of
the late Supreme Court Justice William 0. Doug-
las, "that is agreeable to the traditions of nations
that never have known freedom of press."6
Alarm about the transformation of the First
Amendment from individual liberty to "collective
right" has been moderated somewhat by the
thought that the system damage was quarantined
to the broadcast industry. Thus, Dean Bollinger
championed what he called a "partial regulatory
system,"7 in which limited control over broadcast-
ing content was constitutionally acceptable, so
long as it was not too aggressive and traditional
media remained fully protected." The balance
struck by this theory was based on the understand-
ing that the Federal Communications Commis-
sion ("FCC" or "Commission") has "been extraor-
dinarily circumspect in the exercise of its powers"9
(except in the regulation of "indecency," where it
has "seriously ignored important free speech in-
terests") 10 and that preserving an "unregulated
sector" would maintain a check on government
6 CBS v. Democratic Nat'1 Comm., 412 U.S. 94, 163
(1973) (Douglas, J. concurring).
7 BOLLINGER, at 142.
8 BOLLINGER, supra note 3, at 133-51. See also Lee C. Bol-
linger,Jr., Freedom of the Press and Public Access: Toward a Theory
of Partial Regulation of the Mass Media, 75 MICH. L. REV. 1
(1976).
9 BOLLINGER, supra note 3, at 115.




Concern also was minimized because the pa-
tient was promised a full recovery. The intrusions
permitted by Red Lion were not enshrined as im-
mutable principles of constitutional law, but were
intended to last only until, as the old joke goes,
"til the government needs glasses." The Supreme
Court noted that "because the broadcast industry
is dynamic in terms of technological change[,] so-
lutions adequate a decade ago are not necessarily
so now, and those acceptable today may well be
outmoded ten years hence."' 2 The constitutional
balance that Red Lion struck was based on "'the
present state of commercially acceptable technol-
ogy' as of 1969."13 As the U.S. Court of Appeals
for the D.C. Circuit found, "[i]t may well be that
some venerable FCC policies cannot withstand
constitutional scrutiny in the light of contempo-
rary understanding of the First Amendment and
the modern proliferation of broadcasting out-
lets." 4
President Clinton underscored this point when
he described the differences between the constitu-
tional treatment of broadcasting and the print
media shortly before last November's election:
As you know, the distinction between broadcasting and
publishing in terms of the First Amendment is based on
the scarcity principle. Free over-the-air broadcasting
will continue to be a vital part of our media, and availa-
bility of licenses will continue to be limited. When that
changes, the distinction between broadcasting and
print will change too.15
Passage of the Telecommunications Act of 1996
promised to eliminate this constitutional anomaly
and restore traditional First Amendment under-
standings. As the first comprehensive rewrite of
communications law in over six decades, the law
was intended to remove regulation and free up
competition. The Senate Report on the legisla-
tion noted that "[c] hanges in technology and con-
sumer preferences have made the 1934 [Commu-
nications] Act a historical anachronism." It noted
that "the Act was not prepared to handle the
growth of cable television" and that "[t] he growth
of cable programming has raised questions about
11 Id. at 33, 97, and 114.
12 CBS Inc. v. Democratic Nat'l Comm., 412 U.S. at 102
(1973) (Douglas, J. concurring).
13 News Am. Publ'g. v. FCC, 844 F.2d 800, 811 (D.C. Cir.
1988) (quoting Red Lion, 395 U.S. at 388); see Meredith Corp.
Co. v. FCC, 809 F.2d 863, 867 (D.C. Cir. 1987).
14 Banzhaf v. FCC, 405 F.2d 1082, 1100 (D.C. Cir. 1968).
15 Clinton on Communications, BROADCASTING & CABLE,
the rules that govern broadcasters" among
others.' 6
The House of Representatives' legislative find-
ings were even more emphatic. The House Com-
merce Committee pointed out that "[t]he audio
and video marketplace ... has undergone signifi-
cant changes over the past 50 years and the scar-
city rationale for government regulation no
longer applies."1 7 The Committee Report noted
that there are more than 11,000 radio stations
and 1,100 commercial television stations - a 30%
increase over the past decade. During this time, a
fourth broadcast network came into existence,
and two other networks are emerging. The Re-
port also pointed to additional competition from
cable television. It stated that cable systems
passed more than 95% of television households
and that 63% subscribe. In addition, it pointed to
"other technologies such as wireless cable, low-
power television, backyard satellite dishes, satellite
master antenna television service and VCRs, [all
of which] provide customers with additional pro-
gram distribution outlets that compete with
broadcast stations."' 8 Finally, the Report pointed
to the strong interest by telephone companies in
providing video programming. "This explosion of
programming distribution sources," the House
Report found, "calls for a substantial reform of
Congressional and Commission oversight of the
way the broadcasting industry develops and com-
petes."19
President Clinton signed the Telecommunica-
tions Act into law on February 8, 1996, appearing
to give life to pronouncement from his 1996 State
of the Union Address that "the era of big govern-
ment is over."
PROMISE VERSUS PERFORMANCE
Like many vices, however, the government's
penchant for tinkering with the editorial deci-
sions of broadcasters and others has proved hard
to break. The details of the Telecommunications
Sept. 23, 1996, at 22.
16 TELECOMMUNICATIONS COMPETITION AND DEREGULA-
TION AcT oF 1995, S. REP No. 23, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. 2-3.
17 COMMUNICATIONs AcT or 1995, H.R. REP. 204, 104th
Cong., 2nd Sess. 54.
18 Id. at 55.
19 Id.
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Act, as well as a number of FCC actions over the
past year, demonstrate that the government has
no intention of letting go of its bad habits. Quite
to the contrary, new regulatory proposals are
emerging as if fueled with the hormonal intensity
of an adolescent's sex drive.
Despite the general characterization of the
Telecommunications Act as a deregulation mea-
sure, every provision of the new law that relates to
speech content is re-regulatory. Under Title V of
the law, the so-called Communications Decency
Act, the new law implements the V-chip scheme to
regulate television content, imposes onerous
scrambling and time-shifting requirements on
"adult" video services and adopts the notorious
Exon amendment, which purports to regulate "in-
decent" speech in the on-line context. In addi-
tion, the Telecommunications Act requires the
FCC to establish regulations and implementation
schedules requiring closed captioning for video
programming. 20
Such regulatory initiatives are by no means lim-
ited to the Telecommunications Act. Last August,
the FCC adopted rules that, in essence, require
television stations to transmit three hours per
week of programming "specifically designed to
serve the educational and informational needs of
children."2 1 Under this rule, the government di-
rected that qualifying programming must be aired
between the hours of 7 a.m. and 10 p.m., regu-
larly scheduled at least weekly, and be at least
thirty minutes in length. The educational or in-
formational objective and the target child audi-
ence, must be specified in writing by the broad-
caster in advance, and the licensee must list such
"core" educational shows in programming guides.
As the FCC explained it, the new rules were
designed "to reduce the role of government in en-
forcing compliance."2 2
In addition to the children's television rules,
other content regulations have emerged as the fo-
cal point of federal broadcasting policies. In
many cases, regulatory initiatives begin as sponta-
20 See generally Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L.
No. 104-104, 110 Stat. 56.
21 In re Policy and Rules Concerning Children's Televi-
sion Programming, Report & Order, 11 F.C.C. Rcd. 10,660,
para. 1 (1996).
22 Id. para. 3.
23 Harry A. Jessell, Hundt Calls for Free Time, BROADCAST-
INC, & CABLE, Sept. 30, 1996, at 26.
24 Chairman Hundt Says More Campaign Free Political Time
neous private efforts and evolve into bureaucratic
expectations. For example, during the 1996 elec-
tion cycle a number of broadcast licensees, led by
the Fox Network, announced that they would pro-
vide free television time for presidential candi-
dates. To some federal officials, this seemed to be
such a good idea that they suggested it would also
be good law. 23
FCC Chairman Reed Hundt, for example, in
announcing the offer of free time by television
group owner A.H. Belo, suggested that free time
for political debate is a "key part of the social
compact between broadcasters and the public."24
Chairman Hundt compared the United States un-
favorably with other nations that require "massive
amounts of free time on media for direct commu-
nications between candidates and the public,"
and advocated the adoption of quantitative re-
quirements to be imposed on broadcasters. He
had previously advocated setting aside five per-
cent of digital spectrum authorizations for polit-
ical and educational programming, and suggested
that the government should be "embarrassed" for
asking so little.25
Chairman Hundt similarly has advocated with-
holding or conditioning regulatory approvals for
other licensing matters upon broadcaster pledges
of government-approved programming. In early
1996, for example, the FCC denied several owner-
ship waiver requests that were part of the Disney
merger with Cap Cities/ABC. It had earlier
granted similar waivers in the CBS/Westinghouse
merger, after Westinghouse pledged to provide
three hours per week of educational program-
ming.
Just before the vote on the ABC transaction,
Chairman Hundt noted that "[i]f Disney had
committed to provide over the ABC Network, in a
reliable guaranteed manner, the same amount of
children's educational programming it now pro-
vides over [its Los Angeles station], I would have
taken that into serious account in considering
whether to grant these waivers."2 6 Chairman
and Direct Communications Between Candidates and Public is
Needed, Unofficial Announcement of Commission Action, at
1 (Sept. 24, 1996) (transcript available at the FCC).
25 Reed E. Hundt and Karen Kornbluh, Renewing the Deal
Between Broadcasters and the Public: Requiring Clear Rules for Chil-
dren's Educational Television, 9 HARv. J.L. & TECH. 11, 16-17
(Win. 1996).
26 FCC Open Meeting (Feb. 8, 1996) (video tape avail-
able at the FCC).
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Hundt added, " [w] e know how to take account of
promises to provide public interest program-
ming."
As they used to say in the movies, "we have ways
of making you talk."
The Chairman further advocated making such
deals standard agency practice. "I think we
should consider revising our ownership rules so
that broadcasters will have incentives to provide
public interest programming," he said. "Why
shouldn't our rules contain clear and predictable
and reliable guidelines that will cause us to grant
ownership waivers to broadcasters in return for
their commitment to provide concrete amounts
of public interest programming that the market
under-provides such as children's educational
programming and free air time for political candi-
dates?"27 Generally, Chairman Hundt has advo-
cated "reinventing the social compact," claiming
that "it is going to be necessary to quantify public
interest obligations."2 8 He has described the ad-
vent of digital broadcast technology as an "oppor-
tunity to order up from a wish list what we think is
best for the country."29
A CULTURE OF REGULATION
The current reemphasis on content-based regu-
lation of the media oddly reverses a traditional
presumption underlying federal controls. Broad-
cast licensing was deemed to be necessary because
of the economic and technological factors unique
to broadcasting. Consequently, in NBC v. United
States,30 the Supreme Court held that, because the
economic regulation of broadcasting was neces-
sary, the FCC could also exert some control over
broadcasting content.31 The Telecommunica-
tions Act of 1996, however, takes the opposite ap-
proach. The Act is based on the premise that eco-
nomic regulation is less necessary, that we have
entered an era of media abundance and that mar-
ketplace forces should replace regulatory com-
mands. In the past, the FCC, backed by the
27 Id.
28 Chairman Reed Hundt, Reinventing the Social Compact,
Address at the BROADCASTING & CABLE Interface Conference
(Sept. 24, 1996) (transcript available on-line, (visited Apr. 1,
1997) <http://www.fcc.gov/Speeches/Hundt/spreh637.
txt>).
29 Gary Abrams, Censor Chip?, CAUFORNIA LAw BUSINESS,
Mar. 18, 1996, at 20, 21.
30 319 U.S. 190 (1943).
Supreme Court, has considered such conditions a
reason to reduce content controls over licensed
media.3 2 Now, however, content controls have
taken center stage even as economic regulation
has begun to wither away (at least in theory). This
is the culture of regulation.
Not only has the demand for content regula-
tion intensified, it is extending beyond broadcast
television. Key regulatory provisions of the Com-
munications Decency Act,3 3 including the V-chip
and closed captioning requirements apply to
cable television and other video providers in addi-
tion to broadcast television. More importantly,
the Act's regulation of on-line "indecency" has
nothing to do with television, except for borrow-
ing its regulatory justifications, and applies to a
medium of abundance, not of scarcity. In other
words, the types of speech regulation that repre-
sent "a complete conceptual reordering between
the government and the press and a "virtual cele-
bration of public regulation" have broken free of
their broadcast moorings and are being applied
to all electronic media.
It is not necessary to read between the lines to
see this trend. The 1992 Cable Act requires direct
broadcast satellite providers, who may transmit
hundreds of video channels, to set aside four to
seven percent of their capacity for "noncommer-
cial programming of an educational or informa-
tional nature."3 4 The United Court of Appeals for
the D.C. Circuit rejected a facial challenge to this
provision, uncritically accepting the continuing
validity of Red Lion.
FCC Chairman Hundt has been quite clear in
promoting the culture of regulation. In a speech
last fall he said that it is "reasonable to put all me-
dia under some obligation to serve the public in-
terest. Indeed, all media have typically been party
to some sort of social compact."3 6 He referred to
the 4 to 7% set-aside for DBS, as well as obliga-
tions imposed on cable operators because of their
use of public rights-of-way. The obligations in-
clude leased access requirements, set-asides for
31 Id.
32 FCC v. WNCN Listeners Guild, 450 U.S. 582 (1981).
33 47 U.S.C.A. § 609 (West. Supp. 1996).
34 47 U.S.C. § 335(b) (1) (1994).
35 Time Warner Entertainment Co. v. FCC, 93 F.3d 957,
977 (D.C. Cir. 1996).
36 Chairman Reed Hundt, Reinventing the Social Compact,
supra note 28.
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public, educational, and governmental channels
and must carry obligations. One reason he advo-
cated imposing regulations on all media is that
"[i]t isn't fair or sustainable to put obligations on
broadcast and cable that cannot be sustained
amid the increasing competition among broad-
cast, cable, DBS, LMDS, [and] wireless cable."
Consequently, government control should apply
to all, and "it is going to be necessary to quantify
public interest obligations."3 7
TARGET: INTERNET
It is clear, then, that the debate over the future
of broadcast regulations has ramifications far be-
yond that medium. For example, what effects
might there be on the Internet and the World
Wide Web, "a unique and wholly new medium of
worldwide human communication?"3 8 Judge Stu-
art Dalzell has described the Internet as "a never-
ending worldwide conversation," the "most par-
ticipatory form of mass speech yet developed."39
Given the nature of the new medium, what possi-
ble rationale exists for imposing content controls?
The short answer to this question is contained
in the Communications Decency Act and its legis-
lative history, in which Congress concluded that
the constitutional rationale for radio regulation
embedded in FCC v. Pacifica Foundation,4 0 applies
equally to a medium of unlimited abundance.
Two federal district courts thus far have dis-
agreed with this approach, but the matter will be
resolved by the Supreme Court this year. 41 It is
important to understand, however, that litigation
over the constitutionality of the Communications
Decency Act is only one skirmish in what will be a
long, drawn-out campaign. The culture of regula-
tion already is marshaling its forces for a multi-
faceted assault on Internet freedom.
Take, for example, the FCC's justification for its
children's television rules. Pointing to the gov-
ernment's interest in the well-being of youth, and
s7 Id.
38 ACLU v. Reno, 929 F. Supp. 824, 844 (E.D. Pa. 1996)
(Dalzell, J.).
39 Id. at 883.
40 438 U.S. 726 (1978).
41 ACLU, 929 F. Supp. at 883; Shea v. Reno, 930 F. Supp.
916 (S.D.N.Y. 1996).
42 Chairman Reed Hundt, Address at the WALL STREET
JOURNAL Business and Technology Conference (Sept. 18,
1996) (transcript available at the FCC); Chairman Reed
Hundt, Competition: Walking the Walk and Talking the Talk, Ad-
judicial approval of indecency regulations in
Pacifica and its progeny, the Commission con-
cluded that it is not limited to shielding children
from "inappropriate" programming; it may also
constitutionally compel "appropriate" program-
ming. If some measure of governmental authority
ultimately is upheld for regulation of "indecency"
on the Internet under a Pacifica rationale, does
this mean that the government may also compel
beneficial speech on that medium?
Advocates of regulatory culture seem to think
so. Chairman Hundt has discussed the possibility
of extending the Universal Service Fund (which
subsidizes the availability of telecommunication
services) to supporting Internet services. 42 Pre-
sumably, doing so would be a federal "benefit" for
Internet service providers that would establish a
"social compact" between the government and
service providers. For example, Chairman Hundt
has cited the children's television precedent and
free time offers for political broadcasting and
called upon Internet access providers to "give
some thought to their abilities to contribute to
the public good."4 3 Pointing to the $10 billion
price tag associated with wiring the schools for In-
ternet access, he said it "may seem like a big
number but it's actually less than two tenths of
one percent of the revenues of the information
technology industry."44 He concluded: "[T]here
is no more appropriate time .. . to think about
renewing the social compact between the commu-
nications industries and the public."45
The history of broadcast regulation suggests
that such a "compact" would bring with it "en-
forceable public obligations" that extend beyond
the current "requests" for educational services.
Indeed, some theorists steeped in regulatory cul-
ture have advocated imposing the FCC's political
broadcasting rules on on-line services.4 6 Some in-
fluential lawmakers already seem willing to go
even further, and are not waiting for any new ra-
tionale. Key legislators, including John Dingell
dress at the Media & Communications 96 Conference (Sept. 17,
1996) (transcript available at the FCC).
43 Chairman Reed E. Hundt, Children and the Information
Superhighway: Directions for the Future, Address at the Children's




46 Angela J. Campbell, Political Campaigning in the Infor-
mation Age: A Proposal for Protecting Candidates' Use of On-Line
Computer Services, 38 VILL. L. REv. 517 (1993).
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and Edward Markey (the father of the V-chip)
have opposed legislation that would exempt the
Internet from FCC content regulation. Congress-
man Markey has stated that the Internet should
not be given special status and that services pro-
vided over the medium should be regulated in the
same manner, and to the same degree, as services
offered by other media. Congressman Dingell,
pointing to the possibility of "cable programming
over the Internet," said he opposed any measures
that would "preclude the FCC from applying local
franchising requirements to the Internet."47
Any observer who doubts the direct connection
between advocacy of direct censorship and that of
warmer and fuzzier sounding public interest com-
mitments should listen more closely to the advo-
cates of regulatory culture. The Family Research
Council, a pro-censorship organization, described
the Communications Decency Act as "a once-in-a-
generation opportunity to set ground rules for
the next great communications medium."48
In an eerie parallel, FCC Chairman Hundt de-
scribed the advent of digital broadcast spectrum,
which ultimately will merge computers with
broadcasting, as "a once-in-a-generation opportu-
nity to order up from a wish list what we think is
best for the country."49 The relative attractiveness
of wish lists, like beauty in general, is in the eye of
the beholder. Regardless of ideological differ-
ences between liberals and conservatives, how-




First Amendment visionary Ithiel de Sola Pool
wrote fourteen years ago in his classic work Tech-
nologies of Freedom that "computers [will] become
the printing presses of the twenty-first century"
and that "[n]etworks of satellites, optical fibers
and radio waves will serve the functions of the
47 Ted Hearn, Internet Regulation in On Hill Agenda, MUL
TICHANNEL NEWS, Sept. 23, 1996, at 80. The House Subcom-
mittee on Telecommunications and Finance voted 13-6 to
support the FCC reform bill that would have restricted FCC
regulatory authority. However, the bill died with the end of
the 104th Congress. In any event, the bill was notable be-
cause of the views - and prominence - of its opponents.
48 Smut Out-of-Line Online, Family Research Council,
WASHINGTON WATCH, Vol. 7, No. 4 (1996).
49 Garry Abrams, supra note 29, at 20-21.
present-day postal system." Most importantly, he
concluded that "[s]peech will not be free if these
[technologies] are not also free."50
Noting the "insidious bent"5' of prior regula-
tory justifications that "outlive their need [and]
tend to spread,"52 Pool proposed four principles
that should guide freedom of expression in the
digital age: 53
1. "The First Amendment applies fully to all media ...
electronic as well as print"5 because the Constitution
protects "the function of communication"5 5 not just
the means used to transmit it;
2. "There may be no licensing [and] no scrutiny of
who may produce or sell publications or information in
any form;"5 6
3. Any "enforcement of the law must be after the fact,
not by prior restraint;"5 7
4. "[R]egulation [must be applied only as] a last re-
course . . . . [and] the burden of proof is for the least
possible regulation of communication." 58
These four principles are the antithesis of the
culture of regulation, and it is small wonder that
the political branches and their regulatory ap-
pointees take the opposite approach. Indeed, the
guiding principles of the regulatory culture may
be seen as: (1) regulation applies fully to all me-
dia; (2) speakers must submit to government li-
censing; (3) government will establish quantita-
tive, concrete and enforceable obligations
relating to content; and (4) the ability to regulate
is presumed, and the burden of proof for the ex-
ercise of free speech is on the speaker.
The stark contrast between these two ap-
proaches is probably best explained by the fact
that the culture of regulation is motivated more
by political imperatives than by constitutional val-
ues. Thus, the special urgency with which the
FCC and the White House approached the chil-
dren's TV issue was not unrelated to the fact that
1996 was a presidential election year. The long
deadlock in the proceeding at the FCC ended
only after the White House scheduled a summit
on children's TV and engaged in down-to-the-wire
negotiations with the National Association of
50 ITHIEL DE SOLA POOL, TECHNOLOGIES OF FREEDOM 226
(Harvard Univ. Press) (1983).
51 Id. at 245.
52 Id.
53 Id.




58 POOL, supra note 50, at 246.
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Broadcasters.59 These issues, including the V-chip
and the new FCC rules, were a key part of Presi-
dent Clinton's campaign for reelection and were
incorporated into the Democratic platform.60
Government control over the media in the
name of children has become the ultimate "moth-
erhood" issue, making politicians quake lest they
be labeled anti-kid. A July Washington Post head-
line proclaimed Culture War Score: Dems 5, GOP
0.61 The story claimed that Democrats hijacked
the "Culture War" and "family values" issues, thus
preempting traditional Republican campaign fod-
der.62 It characterized the phenomenon as "one
of the shrewdest political heists in years."63
But while politicians and their appointees are
bound only loosely by constitutional reasoning,
judges necessarily must be more focused on such
concerns. Consequently, the judicial response to
the growth of regulation has been as encouraging
as the political machinations have been discourag-
ing.
First, courts have generally been skeptical about
the continuing validity of Red Lion and the ration-
ale for content regulation. Many observers have
concluded that the original justification for differ-
ent treatment of broadcasting - the purported
scarcity of frequencies - has for years been noth-
ing more than a legal fiction. 64 Along with this
scholarly trend, a growing number of courts have
questioned Red Lion's continuing validity.6 5 Even
with respect to broadcasting, the Supreme Court
has held that the FCC cannot intrude too far into
the editorial discretion of its licensees. 66
Second, courts have emphasized that the FCC's
regulatory power does not automatically extend
to new non-broadcast technologies. Although
59 Chris McConnell, Burning the Midnight Oil Over Kid's
TV BROADCASTING & CABLE, Aug. 5, 1996, at 8.
60 Heather Fleming, TV Gored in Chicago, BROADCASTING
& CABLE, Sept. 2, 1996, at 6; Democrats' Platform Celebrates V-
Chip, Kid's TVDeal, BROADCASTING & CABLE, Aug. 12, 1996, at
16.
61 Paul Farhi, Culture War Score: Dems 5, GOP 0, WASH.
POST, July 7, 1996, at Cl.
62 Id.
63 Id. at C2.
64 See, e.g., H. Geller, Fiber Optics: An Opportunity for a New
Policy ?, A Report of the Annenberg Washington Program
Communications Policy Studies Northwestern University,
1991, at 15 ("the broadcast regulatory model is a failed con-
cept" and "the public trustee scheme . . . is a joke"). See also
BOLLINGER, supra note 3, at 88-90 (describing the rationale of
Red Lion as having "devastating - even embarrassing -
deficienc[ies]," as "illogical," and as being based on" the sim-
ple-minded and erroneous assertion that public regulation is
"[e]ach method [of communication] tends to
present its own peculiar problems,"'6 7 the
Supreme Court has emphasized that "the basic
principles of freedom of speech and the press,
like the First Amendment's command, do not
vary." Those principles "make freedom of expres-
sion the rule."68 For example, efforts to extend
the lesser constitutional regime of Red Lion to the
newer technologies of cable television and the In-
ternet have so far not been successful. In Turner
Broadcast Systems v. FCC,69 the Court explained
that "the rationale for applying a less rigorous
standard of First Amendment scrutiny to broad-
cast regulation, whatever its validity in the cases elabo-
rating it, does not apply in the context of cable
regulation." 70
Early judicial tests of government regulation of
the Internet suggest a similar outcome. In ACLU
v. Reno,71 the three-judge court in the Eastern Dis-
trict of Pennsylvania emphatically rejected broad-
cast-type regulation of "indecent" Internet com-
munications. 72 Judge Dalzell concluded that "the
Internet deserves the broadest possible protection
from government-imposed, content-based regula-
tion."7 3 Any such regulation, he concluded,
"could burn the global village to roast the pig."7 4
To the extent that "the Internet may fairly be re-
garded as a never-ending worldwide conversa-
tion,"75 Judge Dalzell wrote, "[the government
may not . .. interrupt that conversation." 76
These decisions suggest that the judiciary has
not bought in to the culture of regulation. Never-
theless, these trends raise the following questions:
(1) Is the public trustee concept of Red Lion still
valid, and what are its limits? (2) To what extent
will the First Amendment permit regulation of
the only allocation scheme that can avoid chaos in broadcast-
ing").
65 See, e.g., Arkansas AFL-CIO v. FCC, 11 F.3d 1430, 1443
(8th Cir. 1993) (en banc) (Arnold, C.J., concurring). See also
Syracuse Peace Council v. FCC, 867 F.2d 654, 684-685 (D.C.
Cir. 1989) (Starr, J., concurring) (asserting Red Lion has been
undermined by technological and market developments).
66 FCC v. League of Women Voters of Cal., 468 U.S. 364
(1984); CBS v. Democratic.Nat'l Comm., 412 U.S. at 117.
67 Joe Burstyn Inc., 343 U.S. at 503.
68 Id.
69 512 U.S. 622 (1994).
70 Id. at 637 (emphasis added).
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other new technologies? (3) What regulatory the-
ories are emerging to replace Red Lion, and do
they justify a lower level of constitutional protec-
tion for new media than would otherwise exist
under a traditional understanding of the first
Amendment?
Various theories that now are being proposed
as Red Lion replacements are examined in the
book, Rationales & Rationalizations, from which
77 RATIONALES & RATIONALIZATIONS (Corn-Revere, ed.,
Media Institute 1997).
7 If nothing else, the growing number of theories being
this essay is excerpted. 7 None of the theories
has ever been considered sufficient to justify ex-
panded regulation of traditional print media.
They are being discussed increasingly now be-
cause of the government's expanded interest in
content control and because it is not clear that it
can count on Red Lion's scarcity theory forever.78
But the regulatory culture embodied in Red Lion
lives on, at least among those who write the laws.
touted as replacements for Red Lion bears witness to the lack
of faith placed in that precedent by those who favor media
regulation.
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